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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: STANDING TO REPRESENT THE
PUBLIC INTEREST- THE PASSWORD IS INJURY
SierraClub v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
Petitioner, a national conservation club,: brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act2 (APA) to halt proposed commercial recreational
development of Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest.3 Asserting a special organizational interest in conserving national parks and
forests, but refusing to allege any direct effect on the Club or its members,
petitioner sought declaratory and injunctive relief restraining the Secretaries
of the Interior and Agriculture from approving the project.4 The district
court's preliminary injunctions was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit on the ground petitioner did not allege sufficient injury
to deserve standing. 7 On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed and HELD
a longstanding special interest in a problem by even the most qualified organization is not alone sufficient to give that organization standing to secure
judicial review under the APA.8 Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Blackmun
dissented. 9
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts federal judicial
power to cases and controversies. 10 Effectuating this limitation the Supreme
Court has followed a policy of deciding cases only when strictly necessary.-'
The judge-made rule of standing12 supports this "strictly necessary" policy's
by insuring that a party seeking relief presents his dispute in an adversary

1. The Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation with 78.000 members nationally. 405
U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1972).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§101 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as APA].
3. In 1965 the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture invited interested
parties to submit proposals for creation of a recreational development in Mineral King
Valley. The plan submitted by Walt Disney Productions was approved in January 1969.
In connection with the plan, the Department of the Interior proposed to allow the State
of California to build a road traversing Sequoia National Park and also issued a permit
for construction of a power transmission line. Additionally, the Secretary of Agriculture
agreed to issue revokable permits for construction of ski lifts, motels, pools, parking lots,
and sewage treatment facilities on the forest land. The cost of the complex is expected to
exceed $35 million and is designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors daily. 405 U.S. at 729.
4. Id. at 734-36.
5. Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed July 23, 1969).
6. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
7. Id. at 30.
8. 405 U.S. at 739.
9. Id. at 741-60.
10. U.S. CONsr. art. 11, §2.
11. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
12. "Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of standing, as resolved
by this Court for its own governance, have involved a 'rule of self-restraint."' Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). See also
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
13. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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context and in a form capable of judicial resolution.14 The standing requirement, therefore, is not fulfilled by merely alleging meritorious issues 15 or
invasions of a protected interest. 16 The requirement is met only when a
"proper party" makes such allegations. To be a proper party to challenge
administrative action a litigant must show either a sufficient personal stake in
the controversy' or a statutory grant of judicial review.' 9
Without the aid of a statute authorizing judicial review20 litigants faced
tremendout difficulty in showing a personal stake in challenges to administrative action. 2 Realizing this, Congress in 1946 passed the Administrative
Procedure Act, 22 which provides in part: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 23 Early decisions interpreting the APA, however, confused and frustrated
the Act's intended liberalization of judicial review by applying definitions of
"legal interest" and "legal wrong" extant prior to passage of the APA. 2 4 In

14. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). See also Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R.,
347 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958).
15. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
16. Id. at 100.
17. Id.
18. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,

164 (1970); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); L.

JAFFEE,

JUDICIAL

CONTROL

OF

501 (1965).
19. Although Congress may not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to render advisory
opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), or to entertain "friendly suits,"
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943), or to resolve "political questions," Luther
v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), "where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question
whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue'
is one within the power of Congress to determine." 405 U.S. 732 n.3.
20. Courts were willing to relax the restrictive legal right requirement, infra note 21,
when a litigant could assert some statutory authority for judicial review. See ScrippsHoward Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (Communications Act of 1934 conferred
standing on radio station as "person aggrieved" to contest FCC's grant of license to another station notwithstanding there was no legal right to be free from competition). See
also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). Then in Associated Indus. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), Judge Frank, following what he believed to be the rationale of Scripps-Howard, formulated the nowfamous theory that a private party would have standing as a "private attorney general" to
sue in the public interest when authorized by a statute conferring judicial review. Id. at
704. For a criticism of Judge Frank's Interpretation see Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1265, 1314 (1961). See also Berger, Standing To
Sue in the Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969);
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 601 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (standing exists
only when challenged administrative action invades a "legal right"). See also Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§101 et seq. (1970).
23. 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 1962); Ove Gustavsson
Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir. 1960); Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
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* 1970 the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 25 resolved some of the confusion concerning standing under the APA. Recognizing the trend toward enlargement of the class of
people who may protest administrative action, 26 the Court enunciated a
two-pronged test of standing to obtain judicial review of agency action
under the APA: (1) the litigant must allege that the challenged action has
caused him "injury in fact," and (2) the alleged injury must be to an interest
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the
27
statute that the agency allegedly violated.
Although Data Processing's two-pronged test clarified the various, often
conflicting, interpretations of the APA's review provisions- and recognized
the Act's liberal intent,29 the new test was not without its own ambiguities.
The injury-in-fact requirement was easy enough to meet by a litigant suffering
personal economic loss, 30 but it posed a more confusing problem for parties
claiming injury to the public interest. Even though Data Processing held
the injured interest need not be economic but could reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values, 31 the Court provided no insight as to
how the latter injuries to the public interest must be demonstrated.
Thus, the courts had to resolve the question of how an environmental
organization might suffer sufficient injury to its conservational interest to
give it standing under the APA. If a location were damaged or threatened by
governmental action, more liberal courts3 2 would grant standing to an organization that had demonstrated a special interest in that location.3S In

25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26.

Id. at 154.

27. Id. at 153-54. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), decided the same
day as Data Processing. Justices White and Brennan (concurring and dissenting in
Data Processing and Barlow) rejected the second half of the majority's test. They felt
standing should be based only on a showing of injury in fact and that the question of
whether the plaintiffs interest is one protected by a statute goes to the merits of the
case. Id. at 172. Their view is supported in Davis, Liberalized Law of Standing, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970).
28.

See note 24 supra.

29. See text accompanying note 26 supra. See also Davis, supra note 27, at 468.
80.

Both Data Processing and Barlow v. Collins involved economic loss. Economic in-

jury had long been recognized as sufficient for standing. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util.
Co., 390 US. 1, 7 (1968); Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F.R.R., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); FCC
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
31. 397 US. 150, 154 (1970).
32. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservatory v Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949
(1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Ark. 1971);
Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Izaak Walton League v. St.
Clair, 318 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
33. See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 110 (D. Alaska 1971): "Any other
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Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,"34 for example, the Committee and the Sierra Club were granted standing because their past
activities and conduct "exhibited a special interest" in the preservation of
the Hudson Valley environment? Likewise, in West Virginia Highlands Conservatory v. Island Creek Coal Co.3 6 the Conservatory was deemed a proper
party because of its past dedication "to preserving natural, scenic, and historic areas in the West Virginia highlands."37
Other courts, notably the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, employed a
narrower concept of organizational standing.38 Thus, when the instant case
reached the Ninth Circuit, the Sierra Club's demonstrated interest in the
Mineral King Valley's environment was held insufficient to give it standing
to challenge respondents' alleged environmental degradation.3 9 The Ninth
Circuit desired an additional allegation that somehow Club property would
be damaged, its organization endangered, or its status threatened by the
0
contested development.4
The Supreme Court in the instant case was therefore faced with resolving
conflicting views of what must be alleged in order to establish standing by
those claiming injury to widely shared interests of a non-economic nature. The
Court agreed with the Club's allegation that destruction of the scenic, natural,
and historic objects of the park would constitute "injury in fact"' 1 but ruled
that the "injury in fact" test encompassed more than an injury to a cognizable interest; it required the party seeking review to be among the injured.42
Apparently feeling that an allegation of special interest in the Valley
would be sufficient to allow standing to argue in the public interest,43 the
Sierra Club refused to allege that it or its members would be affected in any
of their activities by the development.44 The instant Court felt this approach
rule would have the practical effect of preempting many meritorious actions, as one
individual, or a small number of individuals, would have to sustain the entire financial
burden of the lawsuit."
34. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
35. Id. at 103. See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
616 (2d Cir. 1965).
36. 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
37. Id. at 235. See also Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp.
238, 245 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
38. See, e.g., Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Citizens
Comm. for the Columbia River v. Resor, 2 ERC 1683 (D. Ore. 1971).
39. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 30. See Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th
Cir. 1971) (a more liberal approach would "wreak havoc with administration of government"). The Ninth Circuit's approach was especially crucial to environmental groups, since
75% of public lands are located within its jurisdiction. Carver, The Federal Proprietary
Functions-A Neglected Aspect of Federal Administrative Law, 19 AD. L. REV. 107, 113
(1966).

41. 405 U.S. at 734.
42. Id.
43.
44.

This had been sufficient in the more liberal lower courts. See note 32 supra.
405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
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not only misunderstood traditional "public action" requirements, 45 but also
provided no objective basis upon which to disallow suits by other special
interest groups, however small or short-lived. 46 The Court reasoned that the
history and spirit of requirements for actions brought on behalf of the public
established a dual proposition: first, "injury in fact," whether economic,
aesthetic, or conservational, affords standing to seek review; second, only
after standing is obtained by establishing injury may a litigant argue the
47
public interest in support of his claim.

As Mr. Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, the instant decision represents a practical method of retaining the traditional notions of standing. 48
New situations and novel litigation concepts, however, are becoming increasingly difficult to fit into such traditional notions. Moreover, the validity
of the Court's rationale may be questionable. Its contention that to allow organizational standing to protect the public interest upon a showing of special
interest would offer no objective standard for preventing special interest
groups from dogging the courts with ill-founded claims ignores the Court's
traditional ability to recognize and separate the frivolous from the meritorious.49 In addition, courts have recognized that less stringent standing re-

quirements have not resulted in increased case loads. 50 Arguably, the enormous cost of instituting such litigation will act as an additional barrier to
frivolous suits.51

An alternative to the instant result, urged by Mr. Justice Douglas, is to
confer standing upon the environmental objects themselves,52 letting the
forests, parks, and rivers sue in their own names with "[t]hose who have that
intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or
otherwise despoiled as its legitimate spokesmen.53 Although appearing to be
a novel approach, it merely borrows from inveterate procedures, such as in rem
actions, that have already proved their utility.54

45.

Id. at 736. See note 20 supra.

46. Id. at 739.
47. Id. at 737-38. For the distinction between standing to initiate review proceedings
and standing to assert the rights of the public or third persons once the proceedings are
initiated see 3 K. DAvis, AmNINsrRaATIvE LAw TREATIsE §§22.05-.07 (1968).
48. 405 US. at 755-56. Mr. Justice Blackmun urged in the alternative that the court
either grant standing to the Sierra Club on condition it amend its complaint to conform to
the majority's specifications or adopt the special interest test employed by the liberal
lower courts. Id. at 756-58. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred with the latter alternative. Id.
at 744.
49. Id. at 758.
50. See Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
51. Such a cost factor was considered in Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). See also L. JAEF.,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATivE ACMON, 523 (1965); Note, Competitors Standing To
Challenge Administrative Action Under the APA, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (1956).
52. 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972).
53. Id. at 745. See also Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward

Legal Rights for

Natural Objects, 45 S.CAL. L REv. 450 (1972).
54. See generally G. Gsmon.E & C. BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 31 (1957).
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That the majority was not prepared to depart from the traditional concept of standing does not mean that the instant decision bodes bad favor for
environmentalists. Importantly, the Court made clear that an organization
whose members are injured may represent those members in obtaining
judicial review55 and once review is obtained may argue in the public
interest.5 6 It is also significant that the instant Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's denial of standing but did not adopt that lower court's opinion requiring the Club to demonstrate injury to its property or organization. 7
Instead the Court implied that to obtain review the Club need only show
significant effect to recreational value of members who are real users of the
58
area in question.
But this traditional fusion of "personal stake" and "injury in fact"
standing requirements now applied to public environmental litigation leaves
many questions unanswered. Who would qualify as a real user of an area?
How many real users are needed? Must a user also be a local resident? What is
a significant effect to a user? How could a club have standing to challenge
desecration of remote and uninhabited areas? Thus, the instant decision
must be greeted by environmental groups with guarded optimism, welcolming the rejection of the Ninth Circuit's strict standing requirements, but
waiting for the Court to ossify its implicated guidelines into law through
future litigation. Whatever the future ramifications of the holding, the immediate effect of denying petitioner standing may be as described by Justice
Blackmun: 59
[T]hat the 35.3 million dollar complex, over 10 times greater than
the Forest Service's suggested minimum, will now hastily proceed to
completion; that serious opposition to it will recede in discouragement;
and that Mineral King ... will become defaced, at least in part, and,
like so many other areas, will cease to be "uncluttered by the products
of civilization."
W.

CHRISTIAN

HoYFR

55. 405 U.S. at 739.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 737.
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1970).
405 U.S. at 735.
Id. at 756.
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